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THE LAW OF FACEBOOK: BORDERS, REGULATON & GLOBAL SOCIAL MEDIA- 
CONFERENCE REPORT 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides an outline of the talks presented at the webinar event “The Law of 
Facebook: Borders, Regulation and Global Social Media” on 15 May 2020, jointly hosted by 
the City Law School Jean Monnet Chair of Law & Transatlantic Relations, the Institute for the 
study of European Law (ISEL) and the International Law and Affairs Group (ILAG).  
 
 
Keywords: Facebook; EU law; Social Media; Jurisdiction; Facial Recognition; IT law; Global 
governance; Schrems; Privacy Shield; CJEU; E-commerce 
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Introduction  
The event debated the decision in C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook1 and the wider 
legislative and regulatory context of borders, global social media and transnational regulation 
of the internet. In C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook the Court of Justice considered 
in a small three judge chamber litigation concerning an Austrian politician suing Facebook 
Ireland. There, the Austrian Supreme Court referred to the CJEU whether a host provider was 
obliged to remove posts and whether national courts can order platforms to remove content 
only within the national boundaries, or beyond (‘worldwide’). The decision of the Court has 
been seen as having the capacity to determine whether domestic courts can impose 
monitoring obligations on digital platforms, and of what nature, and how much power courts 
should be given in imposing their own standards of acceptable speech across national 
boundaries. It features as one of a host of decisions at national and supranational level as to 
social media, the internet and the high-profile GDPR but also other measures such as the E-
Commerce Directive. Beyond the specificities of search engines, monitoring and data 
protection authorities and territorial limits, the panel reflected upon Facebook as a global titan 
of transnational social media activity and its constant battle to evade jurisdiction controls under 
EU law. It considered the litigation strategy of Facebook as to the EU-US Privacy Shield in 
litigation ongoing before the CJEU concerning data protection authorities’ powers, individual 
enforcement of transnational agreements and worldwide jurisdiction. An outline of the 
individual talks of speakers is presented here next.  
 
  
                                               
1 Case C-18/18 Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited (2019) ECLI:EU:C:2019:821 
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1. Facebook and EU law: False Friends? 
Elaine Fahey, City Law School, City, University of London  
 
Introduction  
Facebook subscribes to significant amounts of EU law readily e.g. GDPR or subscribes to 
voluntary EU codes of hate speech with Europe contributing 25% of Facebooks global 
revenues. While has swiftly moved millions of Facebook users in the UK to US ‘control’ post-
Brexit, it remains a strong advocate of EU law, even to the point of increasingly advocating for 
a global standard of the GDPR. It has helped along with Apple, Microsoft and Google nudge 
Privacy as Europe’s First Amendment. While post-Schrems, the amount of last instance EU 
courts engaging in key litigation as to Facebook mostly relating to jurisdiction is increasing. 
Yet it frequently involves it being subject to weak indirect host provider obligations. EU courts 
have also emphasises the global dimension to EU law even in such instances. Is Facebook a 
good subject and object of the so-called ‘the Brussels effect’? How much is the global reach 
of EU law actually provable as to Facebook for such a secretive entity as Facebook? Facebook 
subscribes to significant amounts of EU law readily e.g. GDPR or subscribes to voluntary EU 
codes of hate speech with Europe contributing 25% of Facebooks global revenues. While has 
swiftly moved millions of Facebook users in the UK to US ‘control’ post-Brexit, it remains a 
strong advocate of EU law, even to the point of increasingly advocating for a global standard 
of the GDPR. It has helped along with Apple, Microsoft and Google nudge Privacy as Europe’s 
First Amendment. While post-Schrems, the amount of last instance EU courts engaging in key 
litigation as to Facebook mostly relating to jurisdiction is increasing. Yet it frequently involves 
it being subject to weak indirect host provider obligations. EU courts have also emphasises 
the global dimension to EU law even in such instances. Is Facebook a good subject and object 
of the so-called ‘the Brussels effect’? How much is the global reach of EU law actually provable 
as to Facebook for such a secretive entity as Facebook? Facebook is one of the most 
interesting entities, especially its recent relationship with EU law. This relationship begs the 
question of its general engagement with EU regulations – since it is described as 
‘Europeanist’2 – is this a ‘ceiling’ or ‘floor’ engagement?  
 
It is suggested that Facebook is a ‘subject’ and ‘object’ to EU law and the relationship is moving 
at a frantic pace. Facebook is a ‘strong’ global advocate of EU law, more specifically it 
advocates for a global standard of the GDPR whereas other platforms moved over a billion 
people from Europe to the US to circumvent the GDPR. It has also become a professional 
‘lobbyist’ against EU regulations, not through the usual transatlantic diplomatic channels.3  In 
                                               
2 Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect (OUP 2020). 
3 Anthony Gardner, Stars with Stripes (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020) 
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a general scheme, looking at the ‘classic’ understanding of the relationship between Facebook 
and EU law. The examples of the meetings between Mark Zuckerberg and the European 
Parliament show the executive-style of engagement between EU law and regulation. With 
regards to the GDPR there have been high volume of transatlantic businesses very carefully 
engaging with EU law and institutionalisation.  
 
The current project the subject of this talk explores how there have been at least 30 
proceedings before CJEU involving Facebook: from the established areas of law to the new 
and coming areas of regulation. In most of the instances, Facebook is not at the ‘losing end’ 
of the litigation - it has an enormous capacity to absorb within its bureaucracy. It is impossible 
to ignore that Facebook is also as enormous drive behind the capture of data, transparency, 
hate speech, disinformation and algorithms. It is becoming apparent that it is also a 
prevarication between institutionalisation and judicialization; the ways the EU can set up the 
schemes of bureaucracy; the volume of litigation; how much this bounce gets offset by entities 
such as Facebook. It is important to reflect on the idea of data, the term which is used loosely. 
The EU has begun an enormous drive towards single marketing data, common data spaces 
and AI regulation and Digital Services Act. 
  
It is hard to predict how permanent the current state of affairs is. The EU is generally praised 
for being an international privacy pioneer. Yet, since the EU also suffers from patchy 
institutionalisation, imperfect competences and inadequate structuring, there is a variation 
between institutions on collaborative work, platform economy and other areas such as the 
eurozone, migration etc. On global and regional engagement levels, there is a significant 
amount of legal gaps and lack of cooperation in the areas such as net neutrality. From a legal 
perspective, the question remains is how to distinguish Facebook from other GAFA – whether 
it should be seen as a ‘second-generation’ GAFA. A number of years ago in Facebook/ 
Whatsapp merger the European Commission refrained from delineating a market for data as 
it held that the parties were not active in the market of selling stand-alone data products, a 
finding now that appears extraordinary. The EU also conducts manifold investigations on 
Facebook eg as to Libra, algorithms, underscore a lack of a fixed business model that they 
pursue- they are simply fluid. From legal vs economic perspective, third-party tracking is also 
notable. It is not prohibited under EU law but the placing of cookies and the processing of data 
both require a users’ consent, covered possibly by the ePrivacy Directive (as to direct 
marketing) and the GDPR (as to processing).  
 
Data Privacy Shield 
EU data privacy shield is the world’s largest data flow regime between the EU and the US.  
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There is a series of cases involving Facebook. For example, Schrems II case where the 
concept of ‘consumer’ under EU law was enlarged. The most recent case is pending on 
standard contractual clauses. It was significant to note how Facebook was involved in litigation 
in Ireland attempting to hollow out the judicial independence and suggested that broader study 
of its litigation strategy was essential.  
 
Online Intermediaries 
Online intermediaries is an extraordinary area, where Facebook is on another end of the 
litigation. The E-Commerce directive is rather old and Facebook has benefitted from the fact 
that libel was not seen as illegal content. Now, it is concerned with the legal changes taking 
place. The recent cases concerning ‘the right to be forgotten seem to reveal Facebook’s place 
within the scheme. Facebook is subject to a ‘fudge’ of sorts whereby the regulatory landscape 
went only so far and that there is an increased burden of proof imposed on tech companies 
and restrained obligations of Facebook, in turn, placed some sentiments to the effect that the 
EU has a global reach. There is also a strong empowerment of data protection authorities in 
a sense that the reach benefitted Facebook.  
 
EU Competition 
EU competition also extraordinary in regards to Facebook. Some time ago, the Commission 
fined Facebook €110 million for misleading information as to the merger which the 
Commission approved in 2014. In 2016, concerning the terms and conditions linking 
usernames with Facebook identities, it transpired that this was technically possible at the time 
of the merger. Bundestkartellamt in Germany found that Facebook abused its dominant 
position by limiting the amount of data generated by third party websites and merging it with 
users’ accounts. Similarly, in 2018 the Italian Competition Authority found Facebook rules to 
violate Italian consumer protection law. Moreover, a few years FTSE fined Facebook $5 billion. 
There is an 9-year ongoing litigation between the IRS and Facebook on the taxation of profits. 
It is concerned with the whereabouts of $12 billion in European revenue passed through 
Ireland in 2016 with only $29 million in taxes being paid prior to floatation in 2012. At a global 
level, however, a global digital services taxes has been mooted by the OECD and many EU 
countries have introduced digital global services taxes. The EU considers similar actions by 
the end of 2020. The US Trade representative is already investigating tariffs. While Facebook 
publicly has stated that it is willing to pay much higher taxes in Europe it must be remembered 
that the Apple case Ireland is looking to return €30 billion of revenue to reflect on a state aid 
regime. Significant question mark is going forward as to how EU digital services, taxes, global 
tech companies and regulatory first move all fit together.  
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2. The Facebook Oversight Board 
Kate Klonick, St John’s University 
Introduction 
Facebook is establishing a 40-person oversight board to pass rulings on whether or not 
content should remain on their platform. The board aims to represent all regions of the world, 
rulings are set to be released in multiple languages and decisions about content to be made 
expeditiously. Only one researcher, Klonick, was invited in to observe the process that went 
into establishing the framework for this oversight board. Klonick was embedded in Melno Park 
without a non-disclosure agreement, given full access to meetings and was able to record all 
the conversations and workshops. Throughout the process, she maintained her academic 
immunity, not accepting anything from Facebook, not even a free hotel room. Facebook did 
solve many of huge constitutional problems presented by content moderation. But how this 
board will scale, whether it will be overrun with appeals and how will the public will perceive 
its effectiveness are all significant questions.  
 
Overview: 
In light of the law of Facebook, there is a twitter thread is started – who’s got dibs on the first 
legal clinic that is going to be representing people before the Facebook oversight board? It is 
predicted to be a reality – tension between traditional nation state governance and raise of 
third-party overlying sense of governance that is transnational. The pandemic has killed the 
idea of internet exceptionalism for speech when 98% of speech is reliant on private platforms. 
Klonick relied on Jack Balkin’s ‘Free Speech Triangle’4 as a framework for understanding of 
the law of Facebook. This contrasts with the old free speech model - the ‘dyadic’ model. This 
model provides for the relationship with the citizens on the one hand and the state on the 
other. The story of speech was a story which had Constitutions, trying to “keep the boot of the 
state off the neck of the citizens”; fought back with loyalty, exit, voice, voting, the pressing 
power of the citizens. Interestingly, the platforms completely eviscerated became a third part 
of this model turning it into a ‘triatic’ model. Citizens’ concern is not the power of the state 
anymore – they can root around the power of the state through online platforms. The states, 
however, also rely on platforms, to root around democracy. Within that, there is an entire 
system of governance that is developing in the ‘new triate’ space of the platforms: a system 
of government that should try to be in concert with user citizens’ needs, once desired 
expectations at the same time avoiding fines from the nation states and governments.  
 
Why cannot the US government regulate Facebook? One of the reasons is the First 
                                               
4 Jack M. Balkin, ‘Free Speech is a Triangle’ (2018) 118 Columbia Law Review 7  
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Amendment. Secondly, and most importantly, Facebook is a global actor that does not just 
answer to the US government, despite the latter’s power. This global transnational problem 
cannot be resolved by traditional notions relied on in the past years, such as simply passing a 
new ‘thorny’ legislation. In Klonick’s estimation, the oversight board could, at its greatest 
potential, be the first entrée into the platform’s governance: the increasing direct user 
participation. This does not equate with democratisation as it does not include voting; the past 
experience shows the downsides of online voting. There has still to be more direct participation 
– so far based on the idea of ‘cronyism’ (the back-up of the speech by someone) and 
‘inevitism’. This existing system is not seen as sustainable anymore.  
 
The Timeline 
On November 18, Mark Zuckerberg announced the establishment of the oversight board, an 
appeals board to review Facebook’s decision on keeping up or taking down the content that 
was ‘flagged’ by other users on the website. The Oversight board was not intended to be 
somewhat a Congress, jokingly labelled ‘The Supreme Court of Facebook’. In January, Nick 
Clegg, from the UK, announced the launch of the process. The functions of the Board were 
being decided during the first six months; a vague draft Charter was drawn up. Interestingly, 
during the first six months of global consultancy. It involved 50 per cent of the stakeholders 
around the world, including Singapore, New Delhi, Nairobi, Berlin, Mexico City and New York. 
An open portal online has been created for the submissions as to what the Board should be 
like and the content of the Charter. In June 2018 a report was published that summarised the 
process. In August Facebook published a new set of values – revised ‘under-voice’, ‘counter 
acting -voice’ – the primary superceding value: safety, privacy and authenticity. It has to be 
noted that these are Facebook’s values, not the values of the Board itself. To a certain extent, 
these are the substantive Constitutional values that the Board would have to hold Facebook 
to account in reviewing its decisions. In September, the Charter was released. It was a 
‘structural’ document describing the procedure of the Board, its functions, organizations and 
the case process. In December the trust documents were released and an announcement 
made that a $130million irrevocable grant to fund the Board for six years – a $100million more 
than initially estimated. In January 2019, the oversight board’s bylaws were announced. The 
structure, however, does not resemble a corporate charter – looks more like a constitution. 
Article 19, for example, provides for the executive director, Thomas Hughes, to be the Head 
of Administration to run the staff attorneys. In May the board members were announced: four 
co-chairs and a total of twenty members.  
 
The users’ perspective on appeal procedure 
If a user has a post removed, he can appeal that decision to Facebook. If the removal is upheld 
10 
www.city.ac.uk/law 
2020/01 
 
on appeal too, an ID will be generated. They will have to copy and paste and take to a totally 
separate external website. The Oversight board then compiles a file, making a case. The case 
selection committee will be formed, choosing the cases for hearing; determining the most 
relevant. Afterwards, a five-person anonymous panel is formed to review the cases and reach 
decisions. The panel has to reach a majority verdict to be approved by the entire board. If 
approved, the decision is published and sent to Facebook for enforcement. At that point, 
Facebook is only obligated to take the single offensive piece of content, at its own discretion. 
The trust sits between the board and Facebook; the board recommends a new member and 
the Trust appoints them and releases the budget for the salary. The questions have been 
raised what is there for Facebook’s reputation? Just because they are motivated by self-
interest does not imply that they are not trying to make the platform ‘better’ for users. The 
common perception of the oversight board there is sprays in hitch hikers to ‘galaxy’ claiming 
this to be an ‘SEP field’ – ‘somebody else’s problem’. To a certain extent, the oversight board, 
might seem to be a ‘somebody else’s problem’ – it does not fulfil its obligations as a content 
moderator.  
 
 
3. Facial Recognition Technology and Facebook: another brick in the wall 
 
Natalia Menéndez González, European University Institute (EUI) Florence 
 
Introduction 
Facial Recognition Technology (FRT) is in the spotlight nowadays due to its exponential 
adoption and potential impact on the technology, health and economy fields. Even before the 
iPhone X set its access control system by FRT, Facebook had put the technology into the 
mainstream with the face-tagging setting that later became Deepface, its current FRT feature 
empowered by Artificial Intelligence (AI). 
 
Nonetheless, many privacy concerns have started to arise in both the U.S. and Europe 
regarding FRT (and its intertwining with AI further incorporates the concerns regarding the 
latter). Consequently, the pressure has increased the privacy scrutiny on Facebook, to the 
point that there has already been a number of cases against Facebook at this respect. The 
origin of the face recognition feature currently offered by Facebook was implemented in 2012. 
This idea was proposed by an Israeli company in 2009 and its origin stems from the website 
face.com. It invited the members of social networks to use photo- tagging systems and also 
allowed the developers to elaborate face-recognition applications: in May 2010, seven billion 
of pictures were scanned, increasing every minute of the day (as indicated with the automated 
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number teller on the website), allowing for the identification of (millions of) individuals. This 
number increased to over 30 billion pictures.’5 Face.com was later acquired by Facebook. In 
2012 Facebook guaranteed the European regulators that it would forego utilising facial 
recognition technology and erase the information used to recognise Facebook clients by their 
photos after the protest from the regulators and privacy companies. Besides, Facebook 
guarantees the European regulators it would restore the feature on the continent only after the 
approval. Later, Facebook turned on the facial recognition in Europe utilising the European 
Data Protection Regulation as a chance to gather more data from clients choosing the service. 
It also stated that it had informed the original regulator how the technology would function and 
how it would propose to request consent. The clients should also state expressly whether they 
permit or not to utilise this feature.  
 
Opting in takes one click, compared to opting out which is a three-step process. This feature 
was conveyed ahead of the Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). With more than 2.5 billion 
monthly active users Facebook has the biggest database of faceprints. The way facial 
recognition system works – it analyses photos and videos on Facebook, for example profile 
pictures or pictures and videos the person has been tagged in. Facebook creates a unique 
number for them -called a ‘template’. When a person turns the face recognition setting on, 
Facebook uses the template to compare to different photographs, videos and other places 
where the camera is used (live video) to recognize if a person appears in that content. This is 
a significant departure from Facebook’s previous software showing the incorporation of 
Artificial Intelligence/ Deep learning which Facebook and its competitors have been vigorously 
on in the previous years. This area of AI includes software that uses artificial network to figure 
out how to perceive patterns and large amount of data.  
 
Once a face template of an individual is created, Facebook can use it to identify that individual 
in hundreds of millions of other photos downloaded to Facebook each day as well as 
identifying the individual in a specific location. Facebook can also identify individual’s friends 
or acquaintances in the photo.  
 
Facebook estimates that 90% of faces showing in photos are effectively recognised and of 
those 85% are effectively aligned. In this manner, around 76% of the faces showing have face 
signatures computed.  
 
Legal Complaints 
                                               
5 Els Kindt, Privacy and Data Protection Issues of Biometric Applications (Vol. 1) (Springer 2016). 
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In 2014 Facebook had an option to match around 67% of recognised faces with clients. Within 
these figures we can see a great contribution from AI. In 2018 an Alliance of Consumer Privacy 
Organisation filed a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission charging Facebook with 
Facebook’s facial recognition practice needed privacy safeguards and violated the 2011 
Consent Order with the Commission. This complaint followed another one, from 2011 against 
Facebook utilisation of facial recognition. A list of privacy organisations claimed that Facebook 
started gathering clients’ biometric information without their knowledge or consent when it 
executed “Tag Suggestions” in 2011. The complaint requested that the FTC restrained 
Facebook’s utilization of facial recognition until proper safeguards could be built up. The 
Commission at last missed to act on the complaint. Furthermore, Facebook’s clients brought 
a legal claim under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”).6 
 
First of all, the tool recognises faces in uploaded pictures; the tool at that point standardises/ 
aligns the face along the set of parameters, for example, orientation and size. In the next step, 
the face signatures are recognised. This is a series of numbers that represent that specific 
face. The Tag suggestions feature then looks at the database of stored templates for a match. 
There is a match where a face falls inside the threshold of similarity to a stored face template. 
Facebook claims that it stores templates and not face signature. Illinois Biometric Information 
Privacy Act (“BIPA”) requires a corporation that gets an individual's biometric data to: get a 
"written release" from the client or the client's representative prior to collection; give them 
notice that their biometric data is being gathered and stored; and express the length the 
biometric data will be gathered, stored and utilized just as its particular reason. In this phase, 
the plaintiff already alleged that he has suffered a concrete injury because Facebook violated 
section 15(a) and 15(b) of the BIPA which, apart from the mentioned requisites, requires that 
companies erase biometric information within certain timeframe. This legislation has been 
passed in 2008 before the company behind the face.com contacted Facebook to ensure that 
welfare, security and safety of Illinois residents by regulating the collection, use, handling, 
guarding storage, retention and destruction of biometric information. The utilisation of 
biometric identifiers, developing particularly in financial sectors, the Illinois legislator was 
aware that biometric identifiers are biologically unique and cannot be changed. Nonetheless, 
the substance of the case inferring into processual questions of jurisdiction and territoriality 
and the effective concept of aggrieved, Facebook declared at the beginning of 2020 that it will 
pay $550 million to settle in. Consequently, facial recognition technology and legal challenges 
associated with it were not sufficiently tackled in the case. The final decision stated that 
“Taking into account the future development of such technology as suggested in Carpenter, 
                                               
6 Patel v. Facebook (2) (2018) 290 F. Supp. 3d 948.  
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[...], it seems likely that a face-mapped individual could be identified from a surveillance photo 
taken on the streets or in an office building. [...] We conclude that the development of a face 
template using facial-recognition technology without consent (as alleged here) invades an 
individual’s private affairs and concrete interests.’ 
 
In the EU, in a similar line, but earlier on in 2012, an Opinion-29 WP stated that “Prior to a 
registered user uploading an image to the SNS [Social Network Service] they must first be 
clearly informed that these images will be subject to a facial recognition system. More 
importantly, registered users must also have been given a further option as to whether or not 
they consent to their reference template to be enrolled into the identification database.’ 
 
 
4. Global Platforms: Global Laws 
Andrew Murray, London School of Economics and Political Science 
Introduction 
The Cyberlibertarian Myth 
In 1996 John Perry Barlow informed “Governments of the Industrial World” that in Cyberspace 
“You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have 
true reason to fear”. He was of course wrong, at least about the final part of that statement. 
Governments had already demonstrated the ability to regulate intermediaries and platforms in 
cases such as Cubby v CompuServe and Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy. 
 
In fact, the fear of perfect regulation through intermediaries was strong enough to lead to the 
implementation of statutory “mere conduit” provisions in §230 CDA and A.15 E-commerce 
Directive. Over 25 years the wheel has slowly turned and now co-opted (intermediary) 
regulation is being seized upon by governments to leverage control into the online 
environment. However, the first part of Barlow’s challenge remains – is this “moral”? 
 
Murray’s focus has been on the regulation of the platforms in the context of global social 
media. The 1990s marked a high watermark for ‘high libertarianism’, a utopian movement 
where cyberspace was seen as being free from the government interference. Alongside John 
Barlow’s Declaration of Independence for Cyberspace, we also high- water libertarian legal 
Treaties see, Johnson Post’s Law and Borders – The Rise of Law in Cyberspace. These 
documents make some bold political statements. This exceptionalism movement was not 
unique. Barlow’s call was a direct response to President’s Clinton’s the Communication and 
Decency Act 1996. Rather than being exceptionalist or libertarian, the movement was, in fact, 
a response, to sovereign intervention. And in fact, if we look at the act of sovereign 
14 
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intervention, the CDA, we find that it itself was not proactive, it was actually also reactive, at 
least in response to one key provision –§230. The move to online application and enforcement 
of the laws of sovereign states began in the early 1990s. As an illustration, Murray referred to 
Lawrence Lessig, who described cyberspaces being unique. They are the spaces where the 
governments are in the hands of private actors, such as AOL, Cyber Connect. Lessig’s view 
has been influenced by Julian Dibbell’s article,7  which talks about LambdaMOO, an online 
world. There, a wizard Tom Traceback took a direct action for ‘cyberrape’ against Mr Bungle, 
a virtual player. The action led directly to the adoption of democracy in LambdaMOO. Lessig 
believes that cyberspaces are self-regulating communities, similar to little states. He created 
an illusion of self-determination for the online community, where the cyberspace citizens make 
a decision as a legitimate government body. However, they were never online states. Rather, 
they were online clubs, with ‘no more authority than Camden Cricket Club or the Morningside 
Golf Club.’ While having had an absolute authority over their members, they had no legal 
authority. It is a simplified consent by the operation of contract law.  
 
Despite Barlow’s best attempts at political misdirection and Johnson’s attempts to 
exceptionally define cyberspace’s unique jurisdiction, state or sovereign legal authority had 
been already established in the space. In 1991 US District court decided the case of Cubby 
Inc v.  CompuServe Inc where it was decided that the internet service providers were subject 
to traditional defamation law for their hosted content i.e. for content in cyperspace. Successive 
cases developed the jurisprudence, with a particularly complex case being Stratton Oakmont 
v Prodigy. Here, the New York Supreme Court ruled that Prodigy could be liable as a publisher 
of defamatory material as it exercised editorial control over messages on their bulletin boards. 
In other words, Stratton confirmed that the act of moderation was a positive act that turned an 
Internet Service Provider from a distributor with common law defences to a publisher of 
defamatory material. This was a perverse outcome - what these cases meant was to 
disincentivise moderation as only moderated content would fall foul of the Stratton Oakmont 
position. This perversity led directly to §230 of the CDA, the famous ‘shield’, the very Act 
Barlow was protesting. Much has been written on §230 and its counterpart, art12-15 of the E-
Commerce Directive. Ironically, no provision has done more to create the impression for the 
cyber libertarian exceptionalism, than this act of direct intervention by the federal government 
of the US and the subsequent interventions by the EU institutions. It is a mirage of a space 
free of interference created by a legal safe harbour i.e. the act of legal positivism.  
 
                                               
7 Julian Dibbell, “A Rape in Cyberspace or How an Evil Clown, a Haitian Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, 
and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database into a Society" (1994) 3 Annual Survey of American Law 471. 
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The Berkmen and Transnationalism 
Once the errors of cyberlibertarianism were revealed, what Murray labels as 
‘cyberpaternalists’ became the centre of the debate. They are generally a group of academic 
lawyers and policymakers. They accepted that legal positivists position made the laws apply 
to cyberspace and they welcomed the laws as protection from the worst excesses of the 
platforms. They fell into two schools: the Berkmen or techno-deterministic school on the one 
hand – founded on the groundbreaking work of Joel Reidenberg, adopted by Lawrence Lessig 
mostly connected to the Berkman Klein Centre at Harvard. From this school, we get the 
famous “The Code is Law” ethos. The school replaces legal positivism with binary positivism: 
we were once directed by linguistic statutory material and codes of the courts, now we are 
guided by the online regulatory instructions. It is less about the ‘Law’s Code’ and more about 
‘The Code is Law’. The school remains strong with Berkman still being its ‘spiritual centre’. It 
also finds itself in Tilburg in Brussels, where the modern ‘priests and priestesses’, such as 
Mireille Hildebrandt calls for the coders to understand law and the lawyers to understand code. 
Powerful responses to the concept of binary positivism have come from amongst others, David 
Post, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Murray himself. Murray has argued extensively that 
technology is not the driver of social interaction online or offline. The value of digital code as 
a tool for detection and enforcement should not be underestimated. It cannot fully replace 
societal communication values as a standard setter. This is what Murray refers to as ‘network 
communitarianism’. For Murray, binary positivism cannot replace legal positivism as a 
foundational or normative value.  
 
The second school, on the other hand, with the most longevity, is the ‘transnationalist’ or 
‘internet fallacy’ school, exemplified by Jack Goldsmith but also would count Orin Kerr, Julie 
Cohen and Chris Reed among its early supporters. This school sees the internet not as a 
‘space apart’ but as ‘a space between’. Rather than being a ‘self-determining’ space, like a 
state or a canton, it is seen as a space of shared governance and responsibility, like the global 
telecommunications network, geostationary satellites or international air corridors. The best 
analogy is transnational commerce or operators that once regulated by all or none of the states 
with the question of who operates them would be a matter of international private law. This 
school, in Murray’s view is the truest of the analogy of internet governance to the real world. 
The internet and the regulators thereof operate not outside of the legal governance but 
between them. The veracity of this school is established, but also its limitations. In the classic 
case of UEJF and LICRA v Yahoo! The resolution of a simple dispute rendered complex. 
Yahoo! options allowed the sale online of the memorabilia. Article R645-1 of the French Code 
stated that such sale is illegal in France, therefore Yahoo! Simply needed to comply with the 
local law. As per transnational commerce analogy, a US corporation WoHoo! were selling 
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items in a shop in Paris, an order was obtained in a local court and they removed the material 
and the shops closed down. However, Yahoo! argued that their shop was not in Paris, but in 
California and the French citizens were essentially ‘travelling’ to California.  
 
Every Platform Wants to Rule the World 
The transnationalist school probably would not describe the internet regulation even some five 
years ago, but nowadays the internet matured. The best analogy is the Radiocommunication 
Regulation – the radio transmission space was once an unregulated space. One could send 
or receive radio transmission on any frequency and using any equipment. However, this 
needed to be a regulated space. The early internet was like the early radio – too often people 
make a mistake saying it was like the ‘wild west’. However, it never was – it was a 
communications medium: it was a ‘send’, ‘receive’ and bandwidth never control and 
enforceability. With the proliferation of sites, in 2005 there were popular sites dominated by 
single-product websites, Disney, Walmart, Target etc. The network was heterogenous and the 
ability of the states to apply legal control effectively was impaired. By 2020 the network has 
matured, multi-delivering platforms that dominate: Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, Bidoo, 
Instagram etc. many of the platforms are controlled by free companies – Google, Alphabet, 
Facebook and to lesser extent, Microsoft. Substantially, infrastructure support comes from 
other companies such as Apple or Amazon. To leverage effect of the larger portion of real 
estate sovereign state only need to convince the operators that their laws apply to their 
platforms. Thus, we enter the age of ‘platform’ law. There is a debate on the legitimacy of the 
platform capture, which is the regulatory capture of   platform regulators by the states.  
 
How the states establish transnational principles for the borderless Internet? 
The space is not governed by the international Treaties or Convention. In order to explain the 
current position, Murray provided the analogy with the 19th century West. The US was largely 
settled by the land claims: in 1862 the Congress passed the Homestead Act.8 The Act gave 
the citizens and every foreigner seeking the citizenship in the US the right to claim the 
government land. If a seeker used the land for a home or a farm, he would be deemed the 
owner within five years as long as he paid $10. The land was allocated on the ‘first come first 
served basis’. Now, by contrast, the governments make claims in digital platforms space. 
Legal positivism creates ‘uncultivated’ digital space which is allowed to be claimed and re-
claimed by virtue of s230 of the Communications Decency Act and articles 12-15 of the GDPR. 
One of the examples is the Glawischnig-Piesczek,9 where it was held that the E-commerce 
                                               
8 The Homestead Act 1862, promoting the “vote yourself a farm” policy in the US during 1840s-50s.  
9 Case C-18/18 Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited (2019) ECLI:EU:C:2019:821 
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directive does not preclude a member state from ordering a hosting provider to remove or 
block content that was declared unlawful as well as the content that is identical to unlawful 
information. Austria can occupy a part of Facebook-protected space and it can strike a claim. 
This is only one of the many instances where it is said that the GDPR claimed influence far 
beyond the borders of the EU allowing the EU institutions to strike a claim for part of the 
platforms space. Similarly, in Google v Equustek the Canadian courts sought to capture part 
of Google space. In Deripaska, the Russian regulator sought to capture part of Youtube space. 
Legislators too, are alive to these possibilities. The UK Parliament has proposed a specific 
duty of care for online platforms. Germany has an NetzDG law. Australia also has proposed a 
new Online Safety Act.  
 
Murray concluded that what is ‘old is new again.’ He recalled the summer of 1995. Music won’t 
come from Coolio, Take That and The Outhere Brothers. We won’t be going to the cinema to 
see Toy Story, Pocahontas or Goldeneye. We won’t be watching Friends, ER or Seinfeld 
(except on Netflix). But as with the Stratton Oakmont decision in May 1995 we are slowly 
stripping away the protections from platforms (as we once did with ISPs) and states are once 
more seeing intermediaries as an enforcement proxy for the application of their laws, also 
seeing article 17 of the Digital Single Market Directive. We should not expect a new 230 of the 
E-commerce directive, legal positivism is not going to protect digital positivism. Instead, 
platforms will enter political space and maybe the legal space. The oversight board in the first 
of the many such platforms to ‘stake’ their own claims on the space and keep governments at 
an arm’s length. We should not assume this is a positive development although it is true that 
the platforms should definitely take greater responsibility for the content they disseminate. It 
is not always the case that law is better itself than co-regulation.  
 
 
5. Assessing the Limits to the Law of Facebook 
Maria Tzanou, Keele University School of Law 
Introduction 
Tzanou’s contribution focused on the relationship between Facebook and the Court of Justice 
of the EU as seen in two lines of cases Glawischnig-Piesczek and Schrems I & II. She sought 
to discuss whether there are any limits to the Law of Facebook and if so, in what ways these 
can be framed. The CJEU’s Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook judgment dealt with the 
removal of certain defamatory content from Facebook under Directive 2000/31/EC. Two main 
issues arose in this decision: the type of contents that can be removed by platforms such as 
Facebook and the range of application of EU law.  
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Looking at the Glawischnig-Piesczek judgment, it seems that the Court tried to rein in 
Facebook (and Internet intermediaries in general) by showing that Facebook’s law is not 
unfettered but is subject to limitations. This was done under the intermediary liability regime 
established by the E-Commerce Directive, but in the context of a national court injunction. This 
is important in Tzanou’s view because it situates the case in a public enforcement sphere 
where national courts are involved in issues of rights’ adjudication as opposed to cases where 
intermediaries such as Facebook assume the quasi-judicial role to decide the removal of 
content upon a party’s notice in the context of private enforcement. It also seems positive that 
the CJEU in Glawischnig-Piesczek restrained itself from framing the debate on online 
adjudication by Internet intermediaries in terms of fundamental rights - the issue was rightly 
decided in the context of EU secondary law and the obligations of the E-Commerce Directive, 
unlike cases concerning the rights to privacy and data protection, such as Google Spain where 
the Court has used extensively a fundamental rights terminology to resolve private party 
disputes and has delegated fundamental rights adjudication to big tech companies.   
 
The Glawischnig-Piesczek judgment is extremely problematic in many respects. In fact, 
despite the Court’s attempt to rein in Facebook, the judgment ends up doing the opposite: it 
is delegating Facebook even more power combined with less accountability. Briefly, this 
decision raises many normative, doctrinal, practical, technological, jurisdictional and 
procedural questions and is fraught with paradoxes:  
 
i) How is Facebook expected to distinguish cases of ‘general monitoring’ from monitoring 
obligations ‘in a specific case’ when asked to remove ‘equivalent content’? 
 
ii) Why is it assumed by the Court that automation technologies are able to identify 
equivalent content? 
 
iii) How can this assumption work in practice in different contexts over time regarding 
different infringers if the intermediary is not expected to carry out ‘an independent 
assessment’ of the content? How does this differ from general monitoring? 
 
iv) Why did the Court decide to significantly broaden the scope of injunctions in 
Glawischnig-Piesczek without paying any attention to its previous case-law (SABAM/ 
Netlog, UPC Telekabel) and the principle of proportionality? 
 
v) What are the implications of potentially worldwide injunctions granted for 
unharmonized rights? 
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Where does this judgment leave the Court in its encounter with Facebook? 
Instead of delivering a doctrinally and theoretically robust decision regarding injunctions and 
the role of intermediaries in content removal that provides legal certainty and clarity, it exposes 
the CJEU’s technological ignorance and seems to be leaving important interests to be decided 
by Facebook and its automation systems and algorithms. Instead of clarifying, it further 
muddies the waters of what constitutes impermissible general monitoring and acceptable 
removal of equivalent content. And also this is not limited to the EU context.  This is extremely 
problematic if the Court wants to show that it has European or even worldwide authority to put 
limits to Facebook’s law- when it cannot interpret consistently EU law and cannot grasp the 
practical and technological implications of its judgment.   
 
Facebook’s litigation strategy in Glawischnig-Piesczek 
The one expected: Present itself as a neutral intermediary, a mere carrier of content and 
facilitator of conversations, to avoid as much responsibility for how its users behave or how its 
own law and systems are designed and deployed. However, Facebook’s own law gives an 
impression of a better judgment than the one of the CJEU.  Facebook did not seem even to 
make a particular controversial decision in this case- the person at issue, Ms. Glawischnig-
Piesczek was a public figure involved in politics and the allegedly defamatory comments were 
concerning a media article regarding her political party’s policies. While admittedly the CJEU, 
does not deal with the facts of a case in preliminary ruling proceedings- that’s an issue for the 
national courts, the overall picture that comes from this case is not good for the Court. In fact, 
the optics and the impression we get from this case is that -if anything- Facebook did the right 
thing while the ECJ got it wrong. 
 
The second line of cases discussed were Schrems I & Schrems II. These cases concern 
transatlantic data flows and the protection of EU fundamental rights within the context of US 
surveillance programmes, but they originated as a dispute between Max Schrems and 
Facebook regarding the latter transferring Schrems’ personal data to the US where they could 
be to NSA surveillance following the Snowden revelations. As you know, in its Schrems I 
decision the CJEU invalidated the Commission’s Safe Harbour adequacy decision that 
allowed commercial companies including Facebook to transfer EU originating personal data 
to the US.  
 
The decision is again very problematic because it established the extraterritorial application of 
EU fundamental rights but failed to provide clear and in depth analysis regarding the standards 
of the extraterritorial application of these rights and regarding the way the Court assessed US 
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law. In fact, the CJEU has been accused by mainly American scholars of engaging ‘in a series 
of errors’; and, of being driven ‘by EU perceptions that ignore reality’. Schrems II, concerns 
primarily the validity of data transfers to the US under Standard Contractual Clauses, but the 
fate of Privacy Shield that replaced Safe Harbour might be decided in that case as well. The 
Court has not delivered its judgment on Schrems II- this is expected in July, but the AG has 
issued an Opinion in this respect that shows an effort to address the significant deficiencies 
of the Schrems I judgment.    
 
Where does the Schrems I case leave the Court in its encounter with Facebook?  
While it establishes the extraterritorial application of EU fundamental rights, it is a theoretically 
and methodologically very weak judgment that once again fails to recognize technological 
realities – for instance thinking of the CJEU’s artificial and erroneous analysis of the essence 
of the right to privacy that is breached when the content of communications is accessed, but 
not the metadata.   
 
What is Facebook’s litigation strategy in respect to the Schrems cases? 
The litigation strategy appears to be aggressive. In Schrems II, besides arguing in favour of 
the inadmissibility of the Court’s proceedings, stating that what was at issue was outside the 
scope of EU law and questioning the powers of data protection authorities, it is really striking 
that Facebook raised substantive arguments before the CJEU that concern EU law’s 
application- for instance Facebook argued that ‘it would be unjustified, if a third country were 
expected to comply with requirements that did not correspond to obligations borne by the EU 
Member States’, questioning the scope of application of the EUCFR in such cases. This clearly 
goes beyond Facebook’s position as a mere intermediary, although it is understandable 
because Facebook is implicated in the Schrems cases as a commercial entity (and not as an 
intermediary) that therefore has to fight to preserve its commercial rights. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
To conclude, the two lines of cases Glawischnig-Piesczek and Schrems I & II reveal some 
interesting common points: on the one hand, the ECJ is trying to put limits to the law of 
Facebook by establishing strict rules, but at the same time it has delivered very weak 
judgments that ignore technological realities  and undermine legal clarity and the overall 
authority and leadership that the Court wishes to show.  It seems therefore that so far the 
CJEU is all bark but little (not effective nor efficient) bite in its relationship with Facebook. 
 
 
 
21 
www.city.ac.uk/law 
2020/01 
 
 
 
The City Law School 
City, University of London 
Northampton Square 
London EC1V 0HB 
 
T:+44(0)20 7040 3309 
E: law@city.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Email enquiries: Telephone enquiries Find out more, visit 
law@city.ac.uk  +44 (0) 44 02 7040 5787 www.city.ac.uk/law 
 
 
www.city.ac.uk/law 
